Democracy strives towards free, fair, and, consequently, secure elections, but what exactly do we need to accomplish to achieve that? Numerous issues surround this, from who can vote, who cannot vote, voters’ privacy, the accuracy of the vote, and the verifiability of the vote.
A major concern comes at registration. We want to ensure that everyone that is eligible to vote can vote. However, we also want to ensure that no one else can vote, and that these eligible voters may vote exactly once. Here, we balance between security and the effort on the part of the voter and the state that security requires. If registration is difficult, fewer eligible voters will bother. If security measures are expensive, few states will implement and maintain them. Too little security, and the election may be open to fraud. Read more about how to find this balance in Registration.
A similar concern comes in accessibility. Once voters are registered, they should be able to easily vote. Problems of this sort can come as a result of difficult-to-use or confusing voting machines, voting machines inaccessible to people with disabilities, and distant or overcrowded polling stations. To ensure fairness in access, we need well-designed voting machines usable by all at nearby polling stations with reasonable lines and up-to-date voting machines. Read more about this issue in Accessibility.
Maintaining voter privacy is also vital to a fair election. Not only should it be possible for a voter to conceal their vote, but it should be impossible for a voter to prove their vote. Without these restrictions, voters can be forced to reveal their vote and face consequences, opening them up to being coerced into a different vote. While forms of voting that take place outside of controlled polling stations, such as internet voting or mail voting, are inherently vulnerable to coercion, it is still important to take what steps we can to maintain privacy. In internet voting, cryptography is used; in person, ballots are unmarked. See one example of how to fix an internet voting privacy flaw in Cortier.
Now that we have all our eligible, interested voters ready to cast a private vote, we want to make sure that the records we maintain of votes are accurate and verifiable. For the traditional paper ballot, this means that we need to have a ballot with clear choices and then make sure that they are stored and counted by a trustworthy set of people. Since the copy is physical, we can just count them to verify. For electronic voting machines, we need a good user interface and a trustworthy program to count the votes. For verification, ideally the voting machine will produce a paper record to be used as before. Alternatively, it is possible to try to create two completely independent methods of digital storage, but this is generally more difficult. Keeping paper copies is the simplest method. Read more about verification in Recounts and Audits.
It can be difficult to find a balance between these oft-competing needs. How do we walk the line of security, cost, and access?